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COURT OF APPEALS, 1958 TERM
on the mortgage itself.50 He also felt that under the statutory scheme the
United States was sponsor, financier and owner of the entire project, and the
corporations mere fictions created to act as agents for the Federal Government,
and as such not taxable. 1
United States v. City of Detroit,52 is indicative of the Supreme Court's
position that it will not interfere with state taxation of private parties, although
they may be engaged in governmental functions. However, it is still true
".... that possessions, institutions, and activities of the Federal Government
itself . ..are not subject to any form of state taxation."5 The Court of
Appeal's decision not to disregard the mortgagor's corporate entity would seem
to be in keeping with the current trend, although it is possible that the tax-
payers under this arrangement are so closely identified with the Federal Gov-
ernment that the incidence of taxation could be held to fall on the United
States.54
TORTS
UNFAIR COMPETITION-INJUNCTION PoR BAIT ADVERTISING
"Unfair competition" is a concept which fof years has challenged the
abilities of courts to define legal relationships., The opportunity was recently
presented to the New York Court of Appeals in the case of Electrolux Corp. v.
Val-Worth Inc.2 However, the decision handed down does not appear to clarify
the concept. Rather, it would seem that there is greater confusion now than
ever.
Plaintiff Electrolux accepted old vacuum cleaners in trade on its new
models. It would then sell them to defendant at seven dollars apiece. The
latter reconditioned them with non-Electrolux parts and sold them as recondi-
tioned Electroluxes. This went on for a period of about five years, during which
time Electrolux refused to sell its own parts to defendant. In 1952, defendant
inaugurated an advertising program on television offering the rebuilt machines
(using the name Electrolux) at $14.95, which was less than their actual cost.
When viewers answered the ads, a salesman would be dispatched to the home.
Upon gaining entry, he would proceed to "knock" the Electrolux as "a piece
of junk" and make other disparaging remarks about it. He would then attempt
to sell a new competing brand to the potential customer. If he was pressed
50. Pittman v. Home Owners' Loan Corp., 308 U.S. 21 (1939); Federal Land Bank
of New Orleans v. Crosland, 261 U.S. 374 (1923).
51. Clallam County v. United States, 263 U.S. 241 (1923).
52. 355 U.S. 466 (1958).
53. United States v. County of Allegheny, supra, note 49, at 177.
54. See concurring opinion, City of Detroit v. Murray Corp. of America, 355 U.S.
489, 499 (1958); Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110 (1954).
1. Chafee, Unfair Competition, 53 Hanv. L. REv. 1289 (1940).
2. 6 N.Y.2d 556, 190 N.Y.S.2d 977 (1959).
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the salesman would sell the rebuilt machine but received no commission there-
from, his sole remuneration coming from sales of the other new machines.
In 1953 plaintiff brought an action for injunctive relief and damages.
In granting the injunction prohibiting the use of the Electrolux name in
advertising, the Supreme Court found that,
• .. the television broadcasts were calculated to give the impression
that a used Electrolux, with Electrolux parts, which retained the
quality associated in the public mind with plaintiff's product, was
obtainable at a low price, whereas the actual purpose was to dis-
courage purchase of Electrolux and induce the public to buy other
expensive makes.
The Supreme Court construed these practices as "bait advertising" and
as such, unfair to the public as well as to the owner of the trade mark name.
The Appellate Division reversed the injunction against the use of the
name on the ground that for five years plaintiff had sold to defendant whom
it knew to be using these methods of distribution. It further found that
although there was a "lure," defendants did not in fact refuse to sell the
Electrolux machines, having sold five thousand of them during the five year
period.8
The Court of Appeals, in a 6-1 opinion, reversed in part and affirmed in
part, Judge Fuld dissenting without opinion.4 As to the use of the name
Electrolux, the Court agreed with the Appellate Division that plaintiff was
estopped by its knowledge and acquiescence.5 This part of the opinion is
consistent with current authority in the field.6 It reversed, however, in regard
to the "bait advertising" complaint. The decision on this point was reached
by a consideration of three facts: (1) defendant advertised a rebuilt Electro-
lux at a very attractive price in order to invite inquiry (2) defendant's sales-
men "got their foot in the door" in answer to that inquiry but their purpose
was to sell a competing machine, and (3) they then "switched" the transaction
by "knocking" the rebuilt machine and introducing the new machine. The
question is whether or not these facts constitute "unfair competition" which
may be enjoined at the behest of plaintiff. The Court found that it was
"unfair competition" and could be enjoined.7
The conclusion of the Court is reached by a "quasi-evolutionary" process.
Its basic proposition is that although plaintiff is deemed to have consented to
the use of its name in the sales of rebuilt Electrolux machines, ". . . this is
not to say that plaintiff has consented that its name and trademark be used
as a lure in a 'bait and switch' promotion scheme to sell new vacuum cleaners
3. 5 A.D.2d 216, 170 N.Y.S.2d 738 (lst Dep't 1958).
4. Supra note 2.
5. Citing Rothschild v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 204 N.Y. 458, 97 N.E. 879
(1912); Win. H. Keller Inc. v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 298 Fed. 52 (7th Cir. 1923),
cert. denied 265 U.S. 593 (1924).
6. Ibid.
7. Supra note 2.
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in direct competition with itself."8 The Court then gave a brief history of the
law of "unfair competition," pointing out that although it was originally
limited to "palming off," i.e. the sale of goods of one manufacturer as those of
another, 9 the concept of "palming off" has been extended to situations where
the parties are not even in competition.' 0
Moreover, in 1918, the Supreme Court of the United States refused
to limit relief from unfair competition to cases of "palming off" in
International News Service v. Associated Press,"' where defendant
news gathering service was pirating news gathered and reported by
plaintiff to eastern newspapers and then transmitting it, as its own
product, to western newspapers in time for publication in the west.
The Supreme Court commented that defendant is "endeavoring to
reap where it has not sown" and held that plaintiff had property rights
in the freshly gathered news which might not be misappropriated by
defendant. The principle that one may not misappropriate the skill,
expenditures and labor of a competitor has since often been imple-
mented in our courts.
12
Pointing out that the increasing complexity of business activity with its
concomitant opportunities for chicanery requires the courts and the law to keep
pace by providing adequate protection, the Court proceeded to the determina-
tion of the actual issue at hand. It attempted to define the public policy of
the State in regard to "unfair competition" from two statutes. The first,
Section 421 of the Penal Law, which deals with false advertising, has recently
been interpreted to include false advertising with intent not to sell the product
advertised.' 3 The other statute mentioned is Section 396 of the General
Business Law which empowers the Attorney General to bring injunction pro-
ceedings against "advertising . . . with intent, design or purpose not to sell
the merchandise, commodity or service so advertised." The Court carefully
mentioned, however, that it "makes no comment on the applicability of this
statute." It then distinguished this situation from "loss-leader" operations on
the ground that the customer is "trapped in his own home faced with a
choice of the rebuilt machine and a new machine." After pointing out that
this sort of operation is hardly within the recognized bounds of business
ethics, the Court found a reasonable precedent for its position in Bourjois
Inc. v. Park Drug Co.' 4 There, a drug store advertised plaintiff's products at
low prices and when customers came into the store to buy, it was alleged that
8. Id. at 567, 985.
9. Citing Elgin Nat'l Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch Case Co., 179 U.S. 665 (1901).
10. Citing cases.
11. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
12. Supra note 2 at 568, 986; citing Mutual Broadcasting System v. Muzak Corp.,
177 Misc. 489, 30 N.Y.S.2d 419 (Sup. Ct. 1941); Dior v. Milton, 9 Misc.2d 425, 155
N.Y.S.2d 443 (Sup. Ct. 1956); DeJur-Amsco Corp. v. Janrus Camera, 16 Misc.2d 772,
155 N.Y.S.2d 123 (Sup. Ct. 1956); Germanow v. Standard Unbreakable Watch Crystals,
283 N.Y. 1, 27 N.E.2d 212 (1940).
13. People v. Glubo, 5 N.Y.2d 461, 186 N.Y.S2d 26 (1959), noted 9 BuFvAo L.
REV. 129 (1959).
14. 82 F.2d 468 (8th Cir. 1936).
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lies were told about the products to switch the sale to another brand. An
injunction was there dismissed when the facts alleged could not be proved.
In conclusion, the Court of Appeals granted the injunction but denied pecuni-
ary recovery since this is not a trade libel, there being no showing of special
damages.
It is recognized that stare decisis is not an untouchable doctrine. At the
same time, it is felt that the legal profession is entitled to a reasoned elabora-
tion based upon existing principles when an appellate court is passing upon
a question of first impression.
The Court seems to feel that International News Service'5 gives it carte
blanche to expand the concept of "unfair competition" to any competitive
activity which it feels is unethical. In fact, that case has been so whittled
down that it is limited as a precedent to little more than its particular facts. A
survey of the cases in which it has been cited bears out this point. In every
case where an injunction has been granted, there has been some other factor
present, which had been recognized as "unfair competition" prior to the decision
in International News Service,16 so that the reference to it was unnecessary.
For example, Carmen v. Fox Films17 dealt with the interference with an exist-
ing contract; Hoffman Brewing Co. v. McElligot18 with an injunction to
restrain criminal prosecution; Public Ledger v. N.Y. Times"9 with interference
with contract; Marucci v. United Can Co. Inc.20 with imitation of labels. This
is, of course, not a complete list but indicates the direction of the cases. The
cases where International News Service2l has been held to be inapplicable
further exemplify the point. For example, in Cheney Bros. V. Doris Silk
Corp.,22 an injunction was refused where defendant had been copying plain-
tiff's silk designs and underselling him. Judge Learned Hand, in commenting
on the inapplicability of International News Service"3 stated,
We think that no more was covered than situations substantially
similar to those then at bar. The difficulties of understanding it other-
wise are insuperable....24
In Paramount Pictures v. Leader Press,25 the Tenth Circuit refused to en-
join the sale of misleading advertising accessories to plaintiff's pictures which
brought discredit to plaintiff. They held International News Service2 ' to be
inapplicable since "the bill neither alleges facts which constitute the mis-
appropriation of plaintiff's property nor the passing off of the advertising of
15. Supra note 11.
16. Ibid.
17. 258 Fed. 753 (S.D.N.Y. 1919).
18. 259 Fed. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1919).
19. 275 Fed. 562 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
20. 278 Fed. 741 (E.D.N.Y. 1921).
21. Supra note 11.
22. 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929).
23. Supra note 11.
24. Supra note 22 at 280.
25. 106 F.2d 229 (10th Cir. 1939).
26. Supra note 11.
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defendant as that of plaintiff." In Reynolds & Reynolds Co. v. Norick,27 the
Tenth Circuit again stated its position. "The principle underlying unfair trade
practice cases is that one manufacturer or vendor is palming off his mer-
chandise as that of another or that he is vending the products of another as
his own." As late as 1951, Judge Learned Hand reiterated his position that
the case is only authority for the situation there at bar. 28 In short, it would
seem that the Court of Appeals in the instant case has misconstrued the scope
of the precedent. This is borne out by a consideration of the cases it cites for
the principle that a person may not "reap where [he] has not sown."29 One
case deals with the unauthorized radio transmission of baseball games;
30
another with pirating dress designs after an agreement not to copy them;3 1
another with selling products bought in Europe and sold in the U.S. when the
plaintiff has the exclusive American franchise granted by the manufacturer;
3 2
and in another an injunction was refused absent a showing of "palming off"
when defendant copied plaintiff's business methods.3 3 Even the one case which
comes close to the Court's position, Bourjois Inc. v. Park Drug Co.,34 is
easily distinguishable on the ground that in Electrolux the persons approached
were never potential customers of plaintiff. Furthermore, to say that they
had only a choice between the "disparaged" rebuilt Electrolux machine and the
competing expensive brand overlooks the fact that they need not buy either.
The relevance of the authority given for public policy by the Court is at
best tenuous. The statutes cited3 5 would if anything, tend to suggest that the
legislature has made a choice to handle the problem by means other than
private suits for injunction.
In an attempt to outline the concept of "unfair competition" it has been
stated that,
Where the defendant adopts practices which are calculated to mislead
the public or which constitute fraud or deception intended to deprive
a rival of custom, he is liable for engaging in "unfair competition,"
which means that he has exceeded the boundaries of the privilege to
compete. This may be done by intimidating plaintiff's customers, by
defaming him or his goods, by appropriation of various ways, the
plaintiff's custom, good will or reputation, frequently by "passing off"
goods of defendant as those of plaintiff.36
A perusal of the authorities cited for this proposition seems to indicate
that there should be some interference with business relations or "palming
27. 114 F.2d 278 (10th Cir. 1940).
28. National Comics Publication v. Fawcett Publications, 191 F.2d 594 (2d Cir.
1951).
29. Supra note 12.
30. Mutual Broadcasting System v. Muzak Corp., supra note 12.
31. Dior v. Milton, supra note 12.
32. Dejur-Amsco v. Janrus Camera, supra note 12.
33. Germanow v. Standard Unbreakable Watch Crystals, supra note 12.
34. Supra note 14.
35. N.Y. PEN. LAw §421, N.Y. GEN. Bus. Law §396.
36. HARPER & JAmES, THE LAW or TORTS, § 6.13, p. 519.
201
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
off."13 7 This is not to say that the acts complained of in the instant case should
be condoned. The question, rather, is the d propos remedy for protection.
Here, for example, Electrolux could have found another outlet for its trade-ins.
They could also have brought the situation to the attention of the Attorney
General for a possible application of Section 396 of the General Business Law.
An application to the Federal Trade Commission might have had a salutary
effect. Perhaps none of these would be effective, but nevertheless, as was said
by a leading scholar in this area,
The real need for careful thought arises when a court is asked to
enjoin a kind of trade injury, which although novel is bound to arise
again and again. Then, if the court goes ahead, it will be undertaking
the regulation of competition, and not just stopping objectionable
acts by this single defendant. The court will be beginning a perma-
nent job of business management . . . That is what will happen if
they consent to enjoin trade practices now unfamiliar to them like
false advertising or the piracy of dress designs. So, before the courts
start on such a big job, they want to be sure that it can be handled
well in private litigation. Moral indignation against the defendant
and his "dirty tricks" does not suffice to make the relief wise. 8s
Inasmuch as the instant decision has been handed down, what will be its
impact on future cases? It is submitted that it should receive the same treat-
ment accorded the case on which the Court so heavily relies, i.e. International
News Service.3 9 It should be limited in effect to substantially the same fact
situation, leaving to the legislature any further regulation of "unfair competi-
tion."
SUFFICIENCY OF LIBEL COMPLAINT
A recent case, Tracy v. Newsday, Inc.,40 presented the question of the
sufficiency of a libel complaint. The defendant had published in its newspaper
an article concerning the failure of an alleged sex offender, Jerome, to appear
in court for trial. The article relating the events in the case contained a refer-
ence to the effect that plaintiff, who was an investigator for Jerome's attorney,
had helped Jerome carry his bags from his hotel four days before the trial, and
also that plaintiff was the last person to hear from Jerome who had called him
three days before the trial to cancel an appointment to go with plaintiff to the
trial. By way of innuendo plaintiff claimed that the article identified him as
having helped Jerome jump bail and escape the consequences of his criminal
action, that the statements are false, and that as a result he had been held
up to public contempt, disgrace and ridicule and had been irreparably injured
in his calling as a police inspector and criminologist. The Supreme Court
37. Chafee, op. cit. supra note 1; Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation and
Injuries to Personality, 29 Hamv. L. Rxv. 640 (1916); Nims, Unfair Competition by False
Statements or Disparagement, 19 ComerIx L.Q. 63 (1933); see also Chief Justice Hughes in
ALA. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States., 495, 531-2 (1935).
38. Chafee, op. cit. supra note 1.
39. Supra note 11.
40. 5 N.Y.2d 134, 182 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1959).
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